BackgroundRecent advancements in neuroscientific techniques have allowed us to make huge progress in our understanding of memories, and in turn has paved the way for new memory modification technologies that can modulate memories with a degree of precision, which was not previously possible. With advancements in such techniques, new and critical ethical questions have emerged. Understanding and framing these ethical questions within the current philosophical theories is crucial in order to systematically examine them as we translate these techniques to the (...) clinic.Main bodyIn this paper, we discuss the ethical implications of modern neuroscience techniques that aim to disrupt or enhance memories. We attempt to frame the MMTs in the context of existing ethical philosophical theories to provide a cohesive analysis of the myriad of ethical quagmires that might emerge from such technologies. We argue the application of Aristotle’s Golden Mean and multiple accounts of authenticity are useful in approaching the ethical questions surrounding MMTs. We then propose a framework in which ethical considerations can be systematically examined. Lastly, we provide caveats and considerations for the use of this framework. Overall, we provide a practical approach for the ethical use of MMTs depending on the situation.ConclusionWhile at face value, our model appears to put severe limitations on the application of MMTs, we are not completely opposed to their use, but rather our framework guides the agent to consider the implications before making any decisions. Most importantly, we argue that the use of MMTs does not reduce the responsibility of the initial decision, and the agent must accept the post-MMT self as the new “true self” regardless of the outcome. As the developmental trajectory of MMTs suggests we are getting closer to practical clinical applications, ethical concerns across a wide range of disciplines need to be addressed to develop best strategies and policies when dealing with MMTs. If this can be achieved, we believe the ethical use of MMTs is not only possible but would also be of tremendous benefit to many people suffering from memory-related mental disorders. (shrink)

A worldwidemental health crisis is expected, as millions worldwide fear death and disease while being forced into repeated isolation. Thus, there is a need for new proactive approaches to improve mental resilience and prevent mental health conditions. Since the 1990s, art has emerged as an alternative mental health therapy in the United States and Europe, becoming part of the social care agenda. This article focuses on how visual esthetic experiences can create similar patterns of neuronal activity as those observed when (...) the reward system is activated. The activation of the reward structures could have a stress buffering effect, given the interdependence observed between the reward and stress systems. Therefore, could visual esthetic experiences stimulate mental resilience? And if this were the case, could art-based interventions be offered for mental health in the context of COVID-19 and beyond? (shrink)

In his stimulating and provocative collection of essays, Globalization and Justice, Kai Nielsen defends a cosmopolitan account of global justice. On the cosmopolitan view, as Nielsen understands it, individuals are entitled to equal consideration regardless of citizenship or nationality and global institutions should be arranged in such a way that each person's interest is given equal consideration. Nielsen's defense of cosmopolitan justice in this collection will be of no surprise to readers familiar with his socialist egalitarian commitments. Indeed, the internationalism (...) underlying socialism, Nielsen would argue, naturally entails the cosmopolitan account of justice. (shrink)

Ben shu jie shao le gong zi zhen, wei yuan, yan fu, kang you wei, tan si tong, liang qi chao, chen tian hua, zhang bing lin deng wan qing si xiang jia de zhe xue si xiang.

En el Nuevo Testamento griego, el término "kalós" (hermoso, bello) aparece 99 veces y el término "agathós" (bueno), 104. Casi con la misma frecuencia. Se ha traducido y se traduce "kalós" por bueno, lo cual no es exacto. Parece importante retener que Cristo hubiera utilizado tantas veces el concepto de belleza o hermosura, y que invitara al hombre a hacer obras hermosas, a realizar la belleza en su vida. Por eso, según el título de este libro (de 285 págs.), se (...) trata de la belleza no solo que corresponde a la persona de Cristo, sino también la que él comunica a las demás personas, la que se refiere a nosotros por ser obras suyas. Jesús habla de obras "kalá" (hermosas), de frutos "kaloùs" (hermosos) o de corazón "kalê kaì agathê" (hermoso y bueno). La Antigüedad griega también hablaba del hombre "kalòkagathós". Es verdad que todo lo bello es bueno, y viceversa, pero hay que matizar. El propio Jesús se autodenomina "kalós", hermoso, al hablar de sí mismo en el Evangelio diciendo que es el pastor bello. Una palabra clave del presente libro es “razonar”. Los Evangelios son muy escuetos, dicen solo lo imprescindible, fueron vertidos además en otro idioma distinto del que habló Jesús. Hay aspectos que no son comprendidos si no se tiene en cuenta lo razonable. Para comprender el Evangelio no basta con atender al estricto dato teológico contenido en sus textos, tan condensados, sino que es preciso hacer al mismo tiempo una sutil labor filosófica que permita descubrir lo que implícitamente se contiene en ellos. Esta necesaria tarea —liberada de todo fundamentalismo— muestra lo que es más razonable para saber quién y cómo es Cristo. Por ello el libro lleva como subtítulo "Una comprensión filosófica del Evangelio". Y lo hace sirviéndose principalmente de la filosofía de Marías y Ortega, lo cual —a pesar de ser el instrumento intelectual que mejor permite comprender el Cristianismo— no se había realizado todavía. Gracias a ese método, lo primero que se comprende es precisamente la extraordinaria belleza de Cristo y la que comunica a sus discípulos y a quien se hace su servidor, llamado por San Pablo "kalòs", hermoso. Circula la idea, incluso en algunos ambientes católicos, de que la razón y, por supuesto, la filosofía no son aptas para comprender el Evangelio. Este libro, más filosófico que teológico, reivindica el insoslayable papel de la razón, de la filosofía, de lo razonable, para comprender los Evangelios, y debe leerse como un "ensayo de Cristología según la razón vital". Sus consideraciones están hechas a la luz de la razón. No de la razón abstracta, propia del racionalismo, que poco o nada tiene que ver con ella, sino de la razón vital; de la razón sin más. De la razón que conduce a la fe; de la fe que conduce a la razón. El dato histórico, irrefragable, de los cuatro Evangelios postulaba que se estudiara iluminándolo con la razón, sin la cual la fe queda mutilada y coja, abstracta, sin luz propia. Pero la razón había sido frecuentemente vista en ámbitos clericales con malos ojos, con cierta sospecha, sin darse cuenta de que, si es auténtica —y no algo reduccionista—, ilumina, clarifica, disipa las tinieblas. Especialmente porque, en última instancia, la razón procede del Logos, Cristo, la Luz, la Razón por antonomasia, fuente y origen de ella. En el Prólogo de San Juan se unen la razón y la vida; se trata no de una razón abstracta, sino vital. El "Lógos" es entonces la Razón vital. Lejos de ser enemiga de la vida, como sostenían los irracionalistas, la razón es una función vital. Quien recibe al "Lógos" con fe fundada en el amor debe esforzarse por intentar entenderlo con la razón, por buscar su inteligencia. El "Lógos", Cristo, ilumina a quien lo recibe para que se produzca esa comprensión. Los griegos definían al hombre como "zôon lógon échon", el viviente que tiene logos, que tiene razón. Cristo se presenta como el Logos, la Vida ("Zoé") que ha creado a su imagen y semejanza a ese viviente que tiene logos. Luego la razón no se debe subestimar o despreciar, es algo divino; Dios, fuente y origen de toda razón, la Razón misma, desea ser comprendido mediante ella, depositada en cada hombre. «Si la Sabiduría es Dios, el verdadero filósofo es el que ama a Dios», escribe San Agustín. Porque el filósofo es el que ama la Sabiduría, Dios. Jesús dice que «la Sabiduría se ha justificado por sus obras», que «la Sabiduría se ha justificado por todos sus hijos». Los hijos de la Sabiduría, de Cristo, la aman, la justifican, la acreditan, la razonan porque son filósofos. Y la filosofía, el amor a la Sabiduría, es absolutamente necesaria e imprescindible para comprender a Cristo y su Evangelio, que siempre enseña lo razonable. (shrink)

1. Xin yi shu chuang zuo lun, Xin yi shu lun ji -- 2. Mian xiang sheng huo, Lun yi shu de ji qiao -- 3. Yi yi dang shi -- 4. Xi wen le jian -- 5. Ge er bu ge -- 6. Lun Feng jie -- 7. Kai xin yue shi -- 8. Bu dao ding dian, Shen mei de min gan -- 9. Zai zai tan suo -- 10. Liao ran yu xin -- 11. Shen mei tan (...) -- 12. Si zeng xiang shi, Yi shen er ren -- 13. Shen mei xin tai -- 14. Hui jian zi ji -- 15. Diao su diao su -- 16. "Fu huo" de fu huo -- 17. Dong fang ji bai -- 18. Shen yu wu you -- 19. Tu na ying hua -- 20. Qu yu wu xie -- 21. Shu xin, ti ci xuan -- 22. Duan jian can pian. (shrink)

90 nian dai, Du Weiming xian sheng de geng duo jing li zai yu kai zhan "wen hua Zhongguo" de lun yu."Wen hua Zhongguo" zhuo mo zui duo de shi ru jia de ren wen jing shen, yi jiu zheng jiang ru jia ru shi de jia zhi qu xiang he fan su ren wen zhu yi hun wei yi tan de yin xiang, tu xian ru jia yi mai xiang cheng de pi pan jing shen.

Despite flourishing as a multidisciplinary subject, the predominant view in bioethics today is based on Anglo-American thought. This has serious implications for a global bioethics that needs to be contextualized to local cultures and circumstances in order to be relevant. Being the largest continent on the earth, Asia is home to a variety of cultures, religions and countries of different economic statuses. While the practice of medicine in the East and West may be similar, its ethical practices do differ. Thus, (...) the Western understanding of autonomy may not be wholly applicable in the Asian setting, especially in the setting of breaking bad news, giving consent, determining best interests and deciding on end-of-life care. This article explores these topics in depth, attempting to find shared integrating factors, but at the same time arguing for a modified ethical application of autonomy, based on Asian beliefs. (shrink)

Ben shu quan mian chan shu zhu xi de li xue yu ke xue si xiang,Te bie jiu zhu xi zhong shi zi ran yan jiu,Shen ru ke xue tan suo,Chuang xin ke xue si xiang,Chuan bo zi ran zhi shi yi ji zhu xi li xue de ke xue jia zhi zhan kai ju ti de lun shu,Chong fen ken ding zhu xi ke xue si xiang dui yu hou shi ke ji fa zhan de zhong yao zuo yong,Yi (...) qi dui jin tian de ke ji yu wen hua de fa zhan zhu ru yuan tou huo shui. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue for a historical-critical perspective on rationality. In our global age, we in the West need to come to terms with the fact that non-Western traditions have developed complex forms of practical rationality. I will first give an overview of what I call the “Confucian standards of reasoning.” Secondly, I will explain how the Neo-Confucian thinker Zhu Xi 朱熹 has rearticulated the earlier understanding of practical reasoning. Thirdly, I will demonstrate why a comparative perspective may enrich (...) our reasoned engagement with individuals in the Chinese-speaking world. In developing forms of global reasoning, we should make sure that these are neither parochial nor difference-blind. (shrink)

Until recently, most humanities scholars in North America and Europe lived in a world where China was notable for its absence. In the great debates of the 1990s and early 2000s on postmodernism, the end of history, the legacy of Marxism, and the future of liberalism, no Chinese contributions were heard, nor were they in the more recent debates on the relationship between Islam and the West, the post-secular age, genetic engineering, the digital age, or Speculative Realism. Only most recently, (...) with the changed geopolitical situation, are Chinese thinkers starting to receive more attention. In this context, Eric S. Nelson’s book Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century... (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 65 Heft: 3 Seiten: 535-553.

This volume considers in depth and carefully a cluster of issues central to contemporary philosophical and social scientific investigation while utilising methods and conceptualisations at the very cutting edge of philosophy.

I want, some might say, to have my cake and eat it too for I want to be both a cosmopolitan and a nationalist, and, congruently with that, I think liberals and socialists, depending on the societies in which they live, should be either cosmopolitan nationalists or people in sympathy with liberal nationalist projects where these projects have a legitimate point. This includes people like myself who are liberal socialists committed, as all socialists are, to socialist internationalism and the international (...) solidarity that goes with it. How can—or can?—these things consistently go together? Beyond that—consistency being necessary but hardly a sufficient condition for adequacy—why go for cosmopolitan nationalism? Why not instead just go straight-out for cosmopolitanism and its internationalist outlook without the dangler 'nationalism'? (shrink)

Ben shu dui Luling Wang xue de yan jiu, zhu yao cong yi xia liang fang mian zhan kai: shou xian, zhong dian jie shao le ti chu Luling Wang xue de li lun yi ju he Luling Wang xue fa zhan de ge ge jie duan de jie ding, te dian ji qi zhu yao de dai biao ren wu. Qi ci, ju ti lun shu le Luling Wang xue fa zhan de ge ge jie duan de zui zhu (...) yao dai biao ren wu de zhi xue li lu, xin xue si xiang, jing xue te dian. Tong guo dui Luling Wang xue zong ti shang de yan jiu, gai kuo he zheng li yi ji dui ge ge fa zhan jie duan zhu yao de dai biao ren wu Wang xue si xiang de bu tong shi jiao de tan tao chan fa, cong zong ti shang rang shi ren jiao wei xi tong de liao jie Luling Wang xue de gai mao ji qi cao chuang, fa zhan, ding sheng ji shi wei de li shi guo cheng he zhong yao dai biao ren wu de Wang xue si xiang. Tong shi, zai qian mian yan jiu de ji chu shang, dui Luling Wang xue zai Jiang you Wang xue nai zhi Yangming hou xue fa zhan guo cheng zhong de zhong yao di wei yi ji dui zhong wan Ming ru xue si xiang fa zhan de ying xiang zuo le zong jie. (shrink)

An identification is made of the core metaphilosophical, philosophical, and intellectual history theses in Richard Rorty's pragmatism. Their rationale is displayed and it is argued that his metaphilosophical theses are very much dependent on certain of his non‐metaphilosophical philosophical theses, most centrally his anti‐representationalism. Questions emerge about the status and justification of these theses. Rorty, in his programmatic pronouncements, resists providing a vindication of them. Seeking to avoid what has been called performative contradictions, he regards it as sufficient to provide (...) the best narrative going of what is to be said here. It is argued that a more straightforward defence can be provided that does not depart from his holism or his historicism with its setting aside of claims of necessity. (shrink)

This essay explicates and defends a version of moral cosmopolitanism. It builds on the work of Martha Nussbaum and Kwame Anthony Appiah, who in turn build on Cicero and Kant. It is an update in a contemporary idiom of a classical cosmopolitanism. In a time when Enlightenment ideas are widely discounted, it gives expression to an Enlightenment view arguing that there should be a fundamental allegiance to the ideal of a worldwide community of human beings where each human being, just (...) be cause he/she is a human being, is equally a subject of concern and is taken to be of equal worth. Any patriotic concern for nation, or particularly groupings, should be subordinate to that ideal. It defends such a conception against the charge of elitism, unrealistic utopianism, anthropological naiveté and irrelevance, and of the charge that it involves a failure to attend to the importance of particular attachments. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.24(4) 2005: 273-288. (shrink)

Review of: Rudolph A. Makkreel, Kant’s Worldview. How Judgment Shapes Human Comprehension, Chicago, Northwestern University Press, 2021, 288 p. ISBN: 9780810144316.

The term "religious Daoism" first appeared in the Xiang'er commentary to the Laozi. Prior to this commentary, historiographical works only mentioned a "Way of Huang-Lao." For example, the "Biography of Huangpu Song" in the History of the Later Han states:Previously, Zhang Jue from Julu had called himself Perfect Master of Great Excellence. He served the Way of Huang-Lao.

It is sometimes thought that belief in God is rationally required of human beings, for without such a religious belief moral beliefs are without any appropriate ground or rationale. Some have argued that in a Godless world we have no grounds for being persons of good will or for doing what is morally required of us. Indeed, nothing in such a world is morally required of us. If there is no God the concept of moral requiredness becomes a Holmesless Watson. (...) A variety of grounds for such a conception of the relation of religion to morality are explored and shown to be unsatisfactory. To make sense of life or to make sense of morality, belief in God is not necessary. Indeed, only if we do have some autonomous appreciation of morality can we even understand the concept of God embedded in the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition. (shrink)

There are perennial disputes about the scope of reason in human affairs. Some say we can never reason about ends; we can reason only about means. Others argue that this Humean view is mistaken. Still others claim that the crucial and typical use of 'reason' in moral contexts is both moralistic and somehow illusory. It seems to me that there are serious confusions in all these traditional contentions. Reason is not the slave of the passions, and although there is a (...) distinctive use of 'reason' in moral contexts there is nothing moralistic or illusory about it. The temptation to think there is is dispelled once proper note is taken of 1) the distinction between causes and reasons, 2) the proper context of causal explanations and explanations and justifications by reasons, 3) the distinctive roles of 'I want...' and 'I wish...' and 4) the diverse, context-dependent, uses of 'reason'. (shrink)

Philosophy viewed as conceptual analysis has a useful but limited role. C. D. Broad, in two classical metaphilosophical articles , sought to give philosophy a more robust role by providing a rationale for both what be called Critical Philosophy and Speculative Philosophy. Broad's program and arguments are examined and it is concluded what he seeks for both Critical Philosophy and Speculative Philosophy is not viable. It will not serve to keep at bay the wolves of anti‐philosophy‐philosophy.

Read at the Sixty-sixth Annual Meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association at St. Louis, Missouri, May 3, 1968. Some of the crucial thinking in this paper has been much influenced by J. C. Thornton’s brilliant “Religious Belief and ‘Reductionism’,”Sophia, vol. V, No. 3 , and by his “Reductionism—A Reply to Dr. Mascall”,Sophia, vol. VI, No. 2.